An experience of helplessness during the production of a collective autobiographical narrative offers an opportunity to explore points of convergence between Adriana Cavarero's postural philosophy and Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger's matrixial borderlinking. The narrative is treated as a live scene that enfolds the movement of the drive conceptualized in such a way as to avoid the prioritization of death over life. Five successive moves, inspired by Ettinger's rotation of the phallic prism, illuminate affinities between the two thinkers. The first rotation explores (...) the matrixial and relational qualities that compose the scene. The second rotation approaches death from a notional beginning, prioritizing the presence of the mother and her assymmetrical relationship to the infant. The third rotation emphasizes the transformational character of Ettinger's matrixial movement and border-crossing, especially when examined in conjunction with Cavarero's maternal inclination. In the fourth rotation we show how inclination in Lacanian psychoanalysis is linked to the disappearance of the mother from the scene. The introduction of the mother disrupts the Lacanian logic with the possibility of a beginning just as immanent as desire and lack. Movement, qua embrace and unity-disunity, becomes an indispensable component of feminist ontology that captures the immanence of sharing in the matrixial-maternal plane. (shrink)

Intimate partner violence is an important problem that has significant detrimental effects on the wellbeing of female victims. The chronic physical and psychological effects of intimate partner violence are complex, long-lasting, chronic, and require treatments focusing on improving mental health issues, safety, and support. Various psycho-social intervention programs are being implemented to improve survivor wellbeing. However, little is known about the effectiveness of different treatments on IPV survivors' wellbeing. For this purpose, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis to assess (...) the effectiveness of interventions on improving outcomes that describe the wellbeing of adult female survivors of IPV. We searched PubMed, PsycINFO, and Cochrane Library. We explored the effectiveness of available interventions on multiple outcomes that are critical for the wellbeing of adult female victims of IPV. To provide a broad and comprehensive view of survivors' wellbeing, we considered outcomes including mental health, physical health, diminishing further violence, social support, safety, self-efficacy, and quality of life. We reviewed 2,770 citations. Among these 25 randomized-controlled-study with a total of 4,683 participants met inclusion criteria. Findings of meta-analyses on interventions indicated promising results in improving anxiety [standardized mean difference −7.15, 95% confidence interval −8.39 to −5.92], depression, safety, violence prevention, health, self-esteem, social support, and stress management at the post-test. We found that empowerment plays a vital role, especially when treating depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which are difficult to improve across interventions. We found mixed findings on self-efficacy and quality of life. The effects of IPV are long-lasting and require treatments targeting co-morbid issues including improving safety and mental health issues. (shrink)

My dear Aleksandr!I have finally found some quiet time for a slow and attentive read of your article “The Beginning of the Black Notebooks.”1 I very much liked the article, especially for your trul...

"This personification of wisdom with golden hair and a radiant aura echoes both the eternal feminine and the world soul. Rooted in Christian and Jewish mysticism, Eastern Orthodox iconography, Greek philosophy, and European romanticism, the Sophiology that suffuses Solovyov's philosophical and artistic works is both intellectually sophisticated and profoundly inspiring. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt brings together key texts from Solovyov's writings about Sophia: poetry, fiction, drama, and philosophy, all extensively annotated and some available in English for the first time (with assistance (...) from the translators Boris Jakim and Laury Magnus)."--Amazon website. (shrink)

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...) This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. (shrink)

We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...) that he is unable to keep, but only when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows that such “ought” judgments correlate with judgments of blame, rather than with judgments of the agent’s ability. Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral “ought” judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral “ought” judgments, such as what someone ought to do to fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” Instead, judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments of obligation. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to present the fundamental theoretical results concerning inference rules in deductive formal systems. Primary attention is focused on: admissible or permissible inference rules the derivability of the admissible inference rules the structural completeness of logics the bases for admissible and valid inference rules. There is particular emphasis on propositional non-standard logics (primary, superintuitionistic and modal logics) but general logical consequence relations and classical first-order theories are also considered. The book is basically self-contained and special (...) attention has been made to present the material in a convenient manner for the reader. Proofs of results, many of which are not readily available elsewhere, are also included. The book is written at a level appropriate for first-year graduate students in mathematics or computer science. Although some knowledge of elementary logic and universal algebra are necessary, the first chapter includes all the results from universal algebra and logic that the reader needs. For graduate students in mathematics and computer science the book is an excellent textbook. (shrink)

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confidently believe is true. Thus, self-deceivers need not replace one belief (...) with another; rather, they may just increase existing credence in a proposition they already believe is true. (shrink)

People are remarkably smart: They use language, possess complex motor skills, make nontrivial inferences, develop and use scientific theories, make laws, and adapt to complex dynamic environments. Much of this knowledge requires concepts and this study focuses on how people acquire concepts. It is argued that conceptual development progresses from simple perceptual grouping to highly abstract scientific concepts. This proposal of conceptual development has four parts. First, it is argued that categories in the world have different structure. Second, there might (...) be different learning systems that evolved to learn categories of differing structures. Third, these systems exhibit differential maturational course, which affects how categories of different structures are learned in the course of development. And finally, an interaction of these components may result in the developmental transition from perceptual groupings to more abstract concepts. This study reviews a large body of empirical evidence supporting this proposal. (shrink)

Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ∼p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it (...) is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p, which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed. (shrink)

We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S , all definable sets of reals are (...) Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace −∫ (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy. (shrink)

This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3; Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be given preference. (...) And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

Philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch has only recently begun to receive his due from the English-speaking world, thanks in part to discussions of his thought by Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Paul Ricoeur. His international readers have long valued his unique, interdisciplinary approach to philosophy’s greatest questions and his highly readable writing style. Originally published in 1967, Le Pardon, or Forgiveness, is one of Jankélévitch’s most influential works. In it, he characterizes the ultimate ethical act of forgiving as behaving toward the (...) perpetrator as if he or she had never committed the action, rather than merely forgetting or rationalizing it—a controversial notion when considering events as heinous as the Holocaust. Like so many of Jankélévitch’s works, Forgiveness transcends standard treatments of moral problems, not simply generating a treatise on one subject but incorporating discussions of topics such as free will, giving, creativity, and temporality. Translator Andrew Kelley masterfully captures Jankélévitch’s melodic prose and, in a substantive introduction, reviews his life and intellectual contributions. Forgiveness is an essential part of that legacy, and this indispensable English translation provides key tools for understanding one of the great Western philosophers of the twentieth century. (shrink)

In his article, Grossmann argues that, in the context of human cooperative caregiving, heightened fearfulness in children and human sensitivity to fear in others are adaptive traits. I offer and briefly defend a rival hypothesis: Heightened fearfulness among infants and young children is a maladaptive trait that did not get deselected in the process of evolution because human sensitivity to fear in others mitigates its disadvantageous effects to a sufficient extent.

In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which (...) is a refinement of Gerrans’s account of delusion as unsupervised by decontextualized processing, I can have all my reasoning processes working reliably and thus judge that my delusion is false but, if I cannot use their outputs when revising the thought itself, the delusion will persist. I also sketch how this framework explains some interesting cases of failed belief-revision in the general population in which people judge that ~p but nonetheless continue to believe that p. (shrink)

Self-deception makes best sense as a self-defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self-deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self-deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal benefit at the cost of inflicting short-term harm, which is (...) a basis for a unified account of the phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that this view is narrow. Cases of altruistic, benevolent, and even self-punishing self-deception also exist. There, the function is not the self-deceiver's benefit. In fact, self-deception may have no function at all. Therefore, I put forward a novel account that analyses the function of self-deception on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

An algorithm recognizing admissibility of inference rules in generalized form (rules of inference with parameters or metavariables) in the intuitionistic calculus H and, in particular, also in the usual form without parameters, is presented. This algorithm is obtained by means of special intuitionistic Kripke models, which are constructed for a given inference rule. Thus, in particular, the direct solution by intuitionistic techniques of Friedman's problem is found. As a corollary an algorithm for the recognition of the solvability of logical equations (...) in H and for constructing some solutions for solvable equations is obtained. A semantic criterion for admissibility in H is constructed. (shrink)

Le merite de cette etude est son refus de reduire la theologie d'Eckhart au developpement systematique d'une seule notion fondamentale. Mais cette theologie n'y est pas non plus concue comme une sorte d'eclectisme ou chacune de ces notions aurait sa place et trouverait successivement son tour. S'il y a chez Eckhart une notion fondamentale, c'est celle de Dieu, ou, plutot, c'est celle de l'ineffabilite de Dieu. Dieu est l'etre, assurement, mais n'est-il pas plutot l'Un? Ou l'Intellect? Comprendre qu'il est chacune (...) de ces perfections, absolument, purement, donc en apparence a l'exclusion des autres, c'est justement en quoi consiste l'ignorance transcendante qui eleve Dieu au-dela de toutes les affirmations. Vladimir Lossky a ainsi voulu mettre en lumiere le refus qu'oppose Eckhart a toute tentative d'inclure la divinite dans une notion qui se tiendrait pour suffisante a la definir. (shrink)

Less known in the anglophone world than Berdyaev (who was a pupil of his), or Martin Buber, Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900), philosopher, mystic, poet, has nevertheless a contribution of the first importance to offer to Western scholarship. He came from a rich and not yet fully understood tradition; his erudition was stupendous. Like his predecessors he was extremely sensitive to such problems as the religious meaning of history, of creativity, of culture. It is important to emphasize a general link between (...) Solovyov and preceding currents of Russian thought, for his Christian philosophy in a sense embraces them all. Dostoyevsky and Leo Tolstoy sat at his feet. Godmanhood is the problem of restoring all mankind; it is a concept of salvation as a process of becoming divine. The differences between the Orthodox, Roman, and Anglo-Catholic and many of the Protestant Churches are not found in relation to the great dogmas or articles of the creed. Solovyov has a vital and unique message to Christians of all denominations; he offers a basis for reunion rarely suggested in Western Christianity. (shrink)

This article seeks to clarify the concept of progress in philosophy. It treats progress as a kind of development. But not every development is a progress. When we talk about progress, what really matters is the direction of development. In some cases it is relatively easy to reach agreement about this direction. But not in the case of philosophy, if we abstract it from the obvious and the trivial, like the number of books on philosophy. As a result, the article (...) concludes that there cannot be progress in philosophy. Instead we see a continual multiplication of interpretations. (shrink)

Vladimir Jankélévitch left behind a remarkable uvre steeped as much in philosophy as in music. His writings on moral quandaries reflect a lifelong devotion to music and performance, and, as a counterpoint, he wrote on music aesthetics and on modernist composers such as Fauré, Debussy, and Ravel. Music and the Ineffable brings together these two threads, the philosophical and the musical, as an extraordinary quintessence of his thought. Jankélévitch deals with classical issues in the philosophy of music, including metaphysics (...) and ontology. These are a point of departure for a sustained examination and dismantling of the idea of musical hermeneutics in its conventional sense. Music, Jankélévitch argues, is not a hieroglyph, not a language or sign system; nor does it express emotions, depict landscapes or cultures, or narrate. On the other hand, music cannot be imprisoned within the icy, morbid notion of pure structure or autonomous discourse. Yet if musical works are not a cipher awaiting the decoder, music is nonetheless entwined with human experience, and with the physical, material reality of music in performance. Music is "ineffable," as Jankélévitch puts it, because it cannot be pinned down, and has a capacity to engender limitless resonance in several domains. Jankélévitch's singular work on music was central to such figures as Roland Barthes and Catherine Clément, and the complex textures and rhythms of his lyrical prose sound a unique note, until recently seldom heard outside the francophone world. (shrink)

The parameter-free part $$\textbf{PA}_2^*$$ of $$\textbf{PA}_2$$, second order Peano arithmetic, is considered. We make use of a product/iterated Sacks forcing to define an $$\omega $$ -model of $$\textbf{PA}_2^*+ \textbf{CA}(\Sigma ^1_2)$$, in which an example of the full Comprehension schema $$\textbf{CA}$$ fails. Using Cohen’s forcing, we also define an $$\omega $$ -model of $$\textbf{PA}_2^*$$, in which not every set has its complement, and hence the full $$\textbf{CA}$$ fails in a rather elementary way.

Appearing here in English for the first time, Vladimir Jankélévitch's _Henri Bergson_ is one of the two great commentaries written on Henri Bergson. Gilles Deleuze's _Bergsonism_ renewed interest in the great French philosopher but failed to consider Bergson's experiential and religious perspectives. Here Jankélévitch covers all aspects of Bergson's thought, emphasizing the concepts of time and duration, memory, evolution, simplicity, love, and joy. A friend of Bergson's, Jankélévitch first published this book in 1931 and revised it in 1959 to (...) treat Bergson's later works. This unabridged translation of the 1959 edition includes an editor's introduction, which contextualizes and outlines Jankélévitch's reading of Bergson, additional essays on Bergson by Jankélévitch, and Bergson's letters to Jankélévitch. (shrink)

Several attempts have recently been made to point to ‘the proper place’ for hydrogen in the Periodic Table of the elements. There are altogether five different types of arguments that lead to the following conclusions: hydrogen should be placed in group 1, above lithium; hydrogen should be placed in group 17, above fluorine; hydrogen is to be placed in group 14, above carbon; hydrogen should be positioned above both lithium and fluorine and hydrogen should be treated as a stand-alone element, (...) in the center of the Periodic Table. Although all proposals are based on arguments, not all of them sound equally convincing. An attempt is made, after critical reexamination of the arguments offered, to hopefully point to the best possible choice for the position of hydrogen. A few words are also mentioned on the structure of the Periodic Table and the attempts to reorganize it. (shrink)

Answer set programming (ASP) is a form of declarative programming oriented towards difficult search problems. As an outgrowth of research on the use of nonmonotonic reasoning in knowledge representation, it is particularly useful in knowledge-intensive applications. ASP programs consist of rules that look like Prolog rules, but the computational mechanisms used in ASP are different: they are based on the ideas that have led to the creation of fast satisfiability solvers for propositional logic.

The paper has two objectives: to introduce the fundamentals of a triplet model of a concept, and to show that the main concept models may be structurally treated as its partial cases. The triplet model considers a concept as a mental representation and characterizes it from three interrelated perspectives. The first deals with objects (and their attributes of various orders) subsumed under a concept. The second focuses on representing structures that depict objects and their attributes in some intelligent system. The (...) third concentrates on the ways of establishing correspondences between objects with their attributes and appropriate representing structures. (shrink)

We prove that if I is a partially ordered set in a countable transitive model M of ZFC then M can be extended by a generic sequence of reals a i , i ∈ I, such that ℵ M 1 is preserved and every a i is Sacks generic over $\mathfrak{M}[\langle \mathbf{a}_j: j . The structure of the degrees of M-constructibility of reals in the extension is investigated. As applications of the methods involved, we define a cardinal invariant to distinguish (...) product and iterated Sacks extensions, and give a short proof of a theorem (by Budinas) that in ω 2 -iterated Sacks extension of L the Burgess selection principle for analytic equivalence relations holds. (shrink)

Interdisciplinary studies of science form a “living” organism, in which every part performs its function and is connected with other parts. Philosophy of science plays a role of the “think-tank” of that organism. It is a generator of the sense that connects the functions of its separate parts into a systematic unity. It can be called the consciousness of science. Metaphilosophy of science is related to philosophy of science in the same way as philosophy of science itself is related to (...) science. Within metaphilosophy of science the propensity of philosophy of science to self-reflection is implemented. Metaphilosophy of science makes relevant the issues that relate to the philosophical significance of the processes taking place in the so-called “trading zone” (in the sense of P. Galison). These trading zone is a place where scientists, science-of-science theorists and philosophers exchange their ideas. The interaction between philosophy and metaphilosophy of science takes place in the course of a competition among various philosophical interpretations of the results received within the studies of these “trading” processes. Institutional, methodological, historical and culturological studies get a philosophical interpretation and become the source of metaphilosophical ideas. Metaphorically, one may say, that metaphilosophy of science is the self-consciousness of philosophy of science. The very idea that metaphilosophy of science is a participant of the process occurring in the “trading zone” puts an end to a meaningless pile of “metalevels” that very often characterize philosophical discussions of science. (shrink)

We find an explicit basis for all admissible rules of the modal logic S4. Our basis consists of an infinite sequence of rules which have compact and simple, readable form and depend on increasing set of variables. This gives a basis for all quasi-identities valid in the free modal algebra ℱS4 of countable rank.

The dependence of socio-political stability on the emotional expectations of voters is investigated. For this, a model of a socio-political system consisting of a society of voters and a democratically elected politician is considered. The neuropsychological model of the voter takes into account his emotional expectations. The social stability is guaranteed by the expectations of positive emotions of all voters. Socio-political stability means both the social stability and the re-election of politician. One type of voter is a Progressist who seeks (...) to fulfil his desires. It is shown that for the socio-political stability of the Progressist society, is enough a supportive environment. Another type of voter—a Phobic works in a fearful environment. It is shown that for the socio-political stability of the Phobic’s society, regular impacts that support their phobias are sufficient. As an example, emotional expectations, socio-political stability and information management in Eastern Europe are considered. The management of phobias in a weak economy is investigated. It is shown that in the absence of regular impacts supporting phobias a Phobic turns into a Progressist. Then the socio-political system becomes unstable with a weak economy and growth limits. The classification of the main social threats and phobias is given. The socio-political consequences of creating phobias, including corporate psychopaths and toxic leaders, are examined. Ways are proposed to resolve the contradiction between increased consumption and growth limits without the use of phobias, using high humanitarian technologies. (shrink)

The short exposition of the triplet model of concepts and some definitions connected with it are given. In this model any concept may be depicted as having three characteristics: a base, a representing part and the linkage between them. The paper introduces the fuzzification of concepts in terms of the triplet model.

This paper rejects an argument defending the view that the boundary between deception and manipulation is such that some manipulations intended to cause false beliefs count as non-deceptive. On the strongest version of this argument, if a specific behaviour involves compromising the victim’s reasoning, then the behaviour is manipulative but not deceptive, and if it involves exposing the victim to misleading evidence that justifies her false belief, then it is deceptive but not manipulative. This argument has been consistently used as (...) a reason to reject the traditional analysis of human deception, according to which intentionally causing someone to acquire a false belief is sufficient for deception. And because the traditional analysis is also consistent with our most basic intuitions about deception, it does matter whether this argument succeeds. (shrink)

The logic of single-conclusion proofs () is introduced. It combines the verification property of proofs with the single valuedness of proof predicate and describes the operations on proofs induced by modus ponens rule and proof checking. It is proved that is decidable, sound and complete with respect to arithmetical proof interpretations based on single-valued proof predicates. The application to arithmetical inference rules specification and -admissibility testing is considered. We show that the provability in gives the complete admissibility test for the (...) rules which can be specified by schemes in -language. The test is supplied with the ground proof extraction algorithm which eliminates the admissible rules from a -proof by utilizing the information from the corresponding -proofs. (shrink)

Our investigation is concerned with the finite model property with respect to admissible rules. We establish general sufficient conditions for absence of fmp w. r. t. admissibility which are applicable to modal logics containing K4: Theorem 3.1 says that no logic λ containing K4 with the co-cover property and of width > 2 has fmp w. r. t. admissibility. Surprisingly many, if not to say all, important modal logics of width > 2 are within the scope of this theorem–K4 itself, (...) S4, GL, K4.1, K4.2, S4.1, S4.2, GL.2, etc. Thus the situation is completely opposite to the case of the ordinary fmp–the absolute majority of important logics have fmp, but not with respect to admissibility. As regards logics of width ≤ 2, there exists a zone for fmp w. r. t. admissibility. It is shown that all modal logics A of width ≤ 2 extending S4 which are not sub-logics of three special tabular logics have fmp w.r.t. admissibility. (shrink)

The scheme for classifications of concepts is introduced. It has founded on the triplet model of concepts. In this model a concept is depicted by means of three kinds of knowledge: a concept base, a concept representing part and the linkage between them. The idea of triplet classifications of concepts is connected with a usage of various specifications of these knowledge kinds as classification criteria.

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the nonuniversal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The genuine (...) form of the argument seems to be given in different form and far closer to Megarian logical fatalism and its purpose is not to defend laziness. If the historical argument has to lead to a logically satisfactory solution, some additional assumptions and additional tuning is needed. (shrink)

This report of the roundtable that took place on 25 November 2021 at The Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia attempts to explain the obvious growth of interest in Neo-Kantian philosophy in general and the philosophy of the head of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen, in particular. In their contributions, the participants in the discussion demonstrated that the current interest in Neo-Kantianism does not solely or even largely have to do with the history of philosophy but rather with the (...) relevance of many of the ideas of Marburg Neo-Kantianism for the modern theory of cognition, the philosophy of culture, ethics and the philosophy of religion. The course of the discussion highlighted the relevance of Cohen’s theory of cognition based on logic and rationality. The main outcome of the discussion was the conviction that the potential of many of Cohen’s ideas has yet to be fully tapped and there are grounds for considering them to be heralds of a new philosophy which, in many of its features, is only maturing. (shrink)

"Although the original version of Vladimir Jankelevitch's book La mauvaise conscience appeared in 1933, and a second, significantly expanded version appeared in 1951, the present translation corresponds to the 1966 version of the book as it is found in the anthology Vladimir Jankelevitch, philosophie morale."--Translator's introduction.

This is a charming and insightful contribution to an understanding of the "Science Wars" between postmodernist humanism and science, driving toward a resolution of the mutual misunderstanding that has driven the controversy. It traces the root of postmodern theory to a debate on the foundations of mathematics early in the 20th century, then compares developments in mathematics to what took place in the arts and humanities, discussing issues as diverse as literary theory, arts, and artificial intelligence. This is a straightforward, (...) easily understood presentation of what can be difficult theoretical concepts It demonstrates that a pattern of misreading mathematics can be seen both on the part of science and on the part of postmodern thinking. This is a humorous, playful yet deeply serious look at the intellectual foundations of mathematics for those in the humanities and the perfect critical introduction to the bases of modernism and postmodernism for those in the sciences. (shrink)

We prove that in the Solovay model, every OD equivalence relation, E, over the reals, either admits an OD reduction to the equality relation on the set of all countable (of length $ ) binary sequences, or continuously embeds E 0 , the Vitali equivalence. If E is a Σ 1 1 (resp. Σ 1 2 ) relation then the reduction above can be chosen in the class of all ▵ 1 (resp. ▵ 2 ) functions. The proofs are based (...) on a topology generated by OD sets. (shrink)

In this article we show how the universe of BST, bounded set theory can be enlarged by definable subclasses of sets so that Separation and Replacement are true in the enlargement for all formulas, including those in which the standardness predicate may occur. Thus BST is strong enough to incorporate external sets in the internal universe in a way sufficient to develop topics in nonstandard analysis inaccessible in the framework of a purely internal approach, such as Loeb measures.

This is an expository article about the solution to the frame problem proposed in 1980 by Raymond Reiter. For years, his “frame default” remained untested and suspect. But developments in some seemingly unrelated areas of computer science—logic programming and satisfiability solvers—eventually exonerated the frame default and turned it into a basis for important applications.

The main result of this paper is the following theorem: each modal logic extendingK4 having the branching property belowm and the effective m-drop point property is decidable with respect to admissibility. A similar result is obtained for intermediate intuitionistic logics with the branching property belowm and the strong effective m-drop point property. Thus, general algorithmic criteria which allow to recognize the admissibility of inference rules for modal and intermediate logics of the above kind are found. These criteria are applicable to (...) most modal logics for which decidability with respect to admissibility is known and to many others, for instance, to the modal logicsK4,K4.1,K4.2,K4.3,S4.1,S4.2,GL.2; to all smallest and greatest counterparts of intermediate Gabbay-De-Jong logicsD n; to all intermediate Gabbay-De-Jong logicsD n; to all finitely axiomatizable modal and intermediate logics of finite depth etc. Semantic criteria for recognizing admissibility for these logics are offered as well. (shrink)

The widespread assessment of the early period of Semyon L. Frank’s work as being influenced by German Neo-Kantianism is in need of a critical scrutiny. There are several reasons why the Russian philosopher’s interest in Neo-Kantianism merits a closer look. First, two systemic theories belonging to different trends exerted a decisive influence on Russian philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: German Neo-Kantianism and Vladimir Solovyov’s school of all-unity. Second, Frank himself and the German Neo-Kantians considered Nicholas (...) of Cusa to be one of their forerunners and pointed out the importance of his mathematical ideas for their mathematical studies. Thirdly and lastly, Frank paid particular attention, especially in his formative period as a philosopher, to the leading trend in the early twentieth century, namely German Neo-Kantianism, which led some students of his work to believe that German Neo-Kantianism played the decisive role in Frank’s abandonment of Marxism in favour of religious ontology. Frank’s fundamental disagreement with German Neo-Kantianism was expressed in his work The Object of Knowledge in which he criticised the Neo-Kantian concepts of number and time. Although Frank rightly points out the one-sidedness of the Neo-Kantian definition of number, most notably in the works of the Marburg philosopher Paul Natorp, on the whole his criticism of the Neo-Kantian concept of number and time as being different from his own is not entirely convincing. In my opinion, Frank’s attempt to explain the abstract concept of number through a still more abstract concept of all-unity was not crowned with success because he ignored the experience of Christian theology and the Trinity dogma as well as the profound thoughts of the Rev. Pavel Florensky on this topic. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la nostalgie sinon une mélancolie humaine rendue possible par la conscience de quelque chose d'autre, d'un ailleurs, d'un contraste entre passé et présent? Et cette nostalgie n'est-elle pas aussi provoquée essentiellement par l'irréversibilité du temps? Car on ne saurait remonter le cours du temps, tel est l'obstacle insurmontable qu'il oppose à nos entreprises. C'est notre impuissance devant cette impossibilité qui fait toute l'amertume de la nostalgie et l'absurdité des chimères du rajeunissement. La nostalgie n'est pas le mal (lu (...) retour: on peut toujours revenir à son point de départ, à son lieu natal (l'espace se prête docilement à toutes nos allées et venues) mais il est impossible de redevenir celui qu'on était au moment du départ. Mais si le temps s'oppose irréductiblement à la rétrogradation il ouvre devant nous une carrière infinie à la liberté. L'homme peut s'ouvrir à l'idée du futur et confirmer ce que le temps affirme. Se servant d'exemples tirés de la vie quotidienne aussi bien que d'oeuvres poétiques, philosophiques ou musicales, Vladimir Jankélévitch démontre en fin de compte que l'irréversible n'admet qu'un seul remède : le consentement joyeux de l'homme à l'avenir, au futur. (shrink)